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Abstract
Certification according to private sustainability standards (ecolabelling) has become an important 
addition to public fisheries management in recent years. The major global ecolabel in terms of 
comprehensiveness and coverage is the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) Fisheries Standard. 
Under the MSC Standard, the status of the fishery’s target stocks, its impact on the wider eco-
system and the effectiveness of its management system are assessed. Becoming and remaining 
certified requires continuous behavioural adaptation from fisheries through a fine-meshed system 
of conditions attached to certification. In this article, MSC certification of two clusters of fisheries 
in Arctic waters is discussed, one large- and one small-scale. In the Barents Sea cod and haddock 
fisheries, the main obstacle to certification has been the fisheries’ impact on endangered, threat-
ened and protected (ETP) species and bottom habitats, and in order to remain certified beyond 
the first five-year certification period, the fishing companies have had to introduce a number of 
voluntary measures beyond what is required by law. In the local lumpfish fisheries in Greenland, 
Iceland and Norway, conditions attached to certification have been related to the effects of these 
fisheries on seabirds and marine mammals. Here essential parts of a management regime, such as 
biological reference points and harvest control rules, have come about as a direct result of MSC 
certification. MSC certification is no panacea, but it seems to have found a niche as a supplement 
to national legislation and international agreements. 
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Certification by private sustainability schemes has over the past few years become 
a prerequisite for export-oriented fisheries around the world. The golden standard 
of seafood certification is accreditation by the Global Sustainable Seafood Initiative 
(GSSI),1 and the first global scheme to achieve that was the Fisheries Standard of 
the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC).2 Since its establishment in 1997, MSC has 
worked decisively not only to develop an ever more rigorous standard for certifica-
tion, but also to get wholesale supply chains and retailers to commit to purchasing 
MSC certified seafood only. As a consequence, seafood exporters face not only lower 
prices for non-MSC certified products; they are effectively barred from the most 
lucrative markets if their fish is not MSC certified. 
Becoming and remaining certified requires continuous behavioural adaptation 
from fisheries through a fine-meshed system of conditions attached to certification. 
The MSC Certification Requirements – which consist of the MSC Fisheries Stan-
dard and the MSC Fisheries Certification Process (FCP) – only apply to a limited 
extent to fishing companies as such. They primarily involve an assessment of the 
management systems, with requirements as to their outcome (e.g. status of target 
and bycatch stocks and other ecosystem components, such as bottom habitats), 
management measures (e.g. harvest control rules and biological reference points) 
and availability of information (e.g. in the form of stock assessments). Hence, the 
involvement of management authorities at the national and international levels is 
necessary; it is the interaction between fishing companies and management author-
ities that is supposed to drive the sustainability of fisheries forward. To be specific, 
when a fishery is certified with conditions, their representatives have to work with 
management authorities (or scientists or other stakeholders) to meet these condi-
tions within set timelines in order to remain certified. In many instances, this implies 
that national laws, regulations and policies must be changed. 
There is a burgeoning social science literature on private fisheries certification 
schemes in general, and the MSC in particular. Many contributions focus on the per-
ceptions and effects of the MSC beyond fisheries management as such, addressing, 
inter alia, consumer willingness to pay for certified products,3 the legitimacy of the 
MSC Standard among stakeholders4 and the environmental, economic and social 
effects of MSC certification.5 This article takes an “inside” perspective on MSC cer-
tification, analysing the MSC Certification Requirements as a “semi-legislative”/“reg-
ulatory” system and evaluating the effects of certification. The research question is: 
to what extent has MSC certification affected fisheries management (i.e. regulations) 
and fishing practices (i.e. fisher behaviour)?6 The empirical focus is on two clusters of 
fisheries in Arctic waters, one large- and one small-scale. The Barents Sea, to the north 
of Norway and Northwest Russia (see Map 1), is one of the most productive fishing 
grounds in the world. It is home to a typical large-scale fishery, with more than a 
hundred ocean-going trawlers (most of them Russian) taking part all year round. The 
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main fishery is for demersal stocks (i.e. stocks living on the relatively shallow continen-
tal shelf), of which cod and haddock are commercially the most important. The second 
cluster is inshore fisheries for three stocks of one species, lumpfish, in three different 
Arctic states: Greenland, Iceland and Norway. Lumpfish is a semi-pelagic species (i.e. 
moving in the water column) fished mainly in fjords by local fishers and caught pri-
marily for its roe. MSC coverage is high in all these fisheries.7 
While lumpfish is managed at national level in Greenland, Iceland and Norway, the 
most important species in the Barents Sea fisheries are managed at the international 
level, by the Joint Norwegian–Soviet/Russian Fisheries Commission. The Commis-
sion was established by mutual agreement in 1975,8 whereby Norway and the Soviet 
Union decided to treat cod and haddock as joint stocks to be shared 50/50 between 
the two states.9 Approximately 15 % of the TAC for cod (and slightly less for other 
Barents Sea stocks) is traded in quota swaps with the EU, Faroe Islands, Greenland 
and Iceland.10 In addition to setting annual total allowable catches (TACs), the Joint 
Commission oversees scientific research cooperation, harmonization of technical 
Map 1. The Barents Sea (copyright Fridtjof Nansen Institute)
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regulations and coordination of enforcement in various parts of the Barents Sea. 
There are two periods in the Joint Commission’s history where Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated (IUU) fishing has taken place, in the early 1990s and a few years 
around 2005. Apart from this, Norway and Russia have generally succeeded in main-
taining sustainable fishing practices in the Barents Sea.11 
The empirical investigation is based on MSC assessment reports, and the results 
are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 below. Information on the fisheries’ conditions, 
stakeholder comments, objections and work to meet conditions following certifi-
cation is not generally available in aggregate form. To compile the necessary infor-
mation, I have reviewed all assessment and reassessment reports, as well as annual 
surveillance audit reports (between 500–1000 pages per five-year certification period 
for each fishery), for the 15 fisheries (relating to three species and five stocks) cov-
ered in the investigation.12
In the following, an outline is first given of the MSC Certification Requirements, 
i.e. the procedural and substantive rules that govern MSC assessments. In the ensu-
ing section, the results of the MSC assessment of the selected fisheries are presented, 
including information about the assessment process, such as stakeholder submis-
sions and objections. Then follows a discussion of the extent to which MSC certifi-
cation has affected fisheries management (i.e. regulations) and fishing practices (i.e. 
fisher behaviour). 
2 The MSC Certification Requirements
The main actors in an MSC assessment are the Conformity Assessment Body (CAB), 
the MSC itself, the accreditation body Assurance Services International (ASI) 
and the fishery client seeking certification. The MSC is the scheme owner – it pro-
duces the standards and issues certificates, but does not get involved in the assess-
ments directly except for providing technical reviews of the assessment reports. 
MSC is a non-governmental, non-profit organization headquartered in London. 
The assessments are performed by certification bodies, CABs, which compete for 
assignments among fishery clients on a commercial basis. CABs must be accredited 
by ASI in order to perform MSC assessments, and they are under constant scrutiny 
by the accreditation body through document review and physical inspection. The 
fishery client is anyone applying for certification for one or more fishing vessels – it 
may be a company, a regional or national association, or a group of companies or 
associations from different countries. 
The MSC has three main types of programme documents, sometimes referred to 
collectively as the Certification Requirements: i) standards (containing substantive 
requirements for certification); ii) process requirements (to assessments according 
to the standards); and iii) guidance documents (on how the standards and process 
requirements are to be interpreted). These documents are revised in five-year cycles. 
In the following, the MSC Standard v2.0113 and the FCP v2.114 are described. 
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2.1 The procedural requirements: the MSC Fisheries Certification Process 
The first step in a full assessment is to confirm that the fishery is within scope for 
MSC certification (FCP 7.4). A fishery is within scope if the target species are not 
amphibians, reptiles, birds or mammals (FCP 7.4.2.1) and poisons or explosives 
are not used (FCP 7.4.2.2). Further, the fishery must not be conducted under a 
controversial unilateral exemption to an international agreement (FCP 7.4.3), be 
overwhelmed by dispute15 or fail to contain a mechanism for solving disputes (FCP 
7.4.5). Nor must it include entities that have been successfully prosecuted for forced 
or child labour (FCP 7.4.4). 
The next step is to define the Unit of Assessment (UoA). The UoA shall include: 
i)  the target stock(s); ii) the fishing method or gear type(s), vessel type(s) and/or 
practices; and iii) the group of vessels whose fishing operations are to be covered by 
the assessment (FCP 7.5.2). At a later stage in the process, the client – the company 
or group of companies seeking certification – must decide on the Unit of Certifi-
cation (UoC) (FCP 7.5.3), i.e whether the whole UoA or just a part of it shall be 
covered by the specific certificate. Other vessels in the UoA, whose fishing activities 
have been covered by the assessment, are termed “other eligible fishers” and can 
join the certificate through a sharing agreement with the client (FCP 7.5.7). This is 
normally not done for free since the certification process involves considerable costs 
for the client. 
The public announcement of an assessment takes place with the posting on the MSC 
website of the Announcement Comment Draft Report (ACDR) (FCP 7.15.1). The 
ACDR is an almost full version of the assessment report, but with indicative scoring 
ranges rather than specific scores (see below). Every assessment process involves a site 
visit, where the assessment team goes onsite to conduct interviews with stakeholders 
in the fishery, like scientists, managers, representatives of enforcement bodies, industry 
groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The fishery is scored according 
to a fine-meshed system of Scoring Issues (SIs) – called the Assessment Tree (see next 
section) – attached to a number of Performance Indicators (PIs), within the three MSC 
Principles: Principle 1 (P1) on the status of the target stock(s), Principle 2 (P2) on 
the ecosystem impact of the fishery and Principle 3 (P3) on the management system. 
Specific requirements are assigned to each SI, the so-called Scoring Guideposts (SGs) 
for scores at 60, 80 and 100. For a fishery to pass the assessment, no SI may score less 
than 60, and the average weighted score of each of the three Principles must be at 80 or 
above. Hence, a fishery may score at 60 on one PI, but then it must achieve a 100 score 
on another PI in order to reach an average of 80 on that Principle. Most PIs consist of 
several SIs, and scores are given at increments of five points (FCP 7.17.5). 
If a score between 60 and 80 is given for an individual SI, one or more “auditable 
and verifiable conditions [for certification]” must be set by the assessment team 
(FCP 7.18.1). The team shall draft conditions that, when implemented, shall result 
in improved performance to at least the 80 level within the five-year period during 
which the certificate is valid (FPC 7.18.1.3). The conditions shall include milestones 
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that specify the actions that the client must meet at each annual surveillance audit 
(see below) during the five-year certification period. The milestones shall, inter alia, 
identify “measurable improvements and outcomes (using quantitative metrics) 
expected each year” (FCP 7.18.1.4(a). Once the CAB has determined the condi-
tions and milestones to be attached to the fishery, and has taken into account all 
available information as per the last day of the site visit, the assessment team com-
pletes the Client and Peer Review Draft Report (CPRDR) (FCP 7.19). The CPRDR 
goes to the client for comments and production of a Client Action Plan (CAP), in 
which they must detail how they intend to work towards meeting the annual mile-
stones in the conditions set by the assessment team in order to bring the score up to 
80 within the five-year certification period. The CPRDR also goes to the MSC Peer 
Review College, where two suitable peer reviewers are drawn from a pool of qualified 
experts. When the assessment team has responded to the comments from the client 
and peer reviewers, the Public Comment Draft Report (PCDR) is posted on the 
MSC website for public comments during a 30-day period (FCP 7.20). The PCDR 
also goes back to the peer reviewers for a second round of comments (FCP 7.20.9) 
and to the MSC for so-called Technical Oversight (FCP 7.20.10). The latter involves 
a “legality check” in which the scoring of each SI is controlled, taking into account 
the wording of the guideposts, the relevant guidance and interpretations as well as 
the assessment team’s justification and documentation of its scores. When the team 
has responded to the comments from stakeholders, peer reviewers (second round) 
and the MSC, the Final Draft Report is produced and published on the MSC web-
site (FCP 7.22), after which a 15 working day objection period follows (FCP 7.23). 
The objection procedure is outlined in a separate annex to the FCP (Annex PD). 
Importantly, the procedure is not intended to result in a new assessment of the fish-
ery against the Standard, but to determine whether the assessment team made any 
procedural errors (including using the available evidence incorrectly in determining 
the scores) “material to the determination or the fairness of the assessment” (PD 
2.1.1.1). The objection procedure is open only to parties who made written sub-
missions earlier in the assessment process (PD 2.1.2), and is led by an Independent 
Adjudicator (a civilian judge, attorney or professor of law) appointed by the MSC 
for a three-year period (PD 2.2). The Independent Adjudicator must first determine 
whether the filed objection is in the required form and that it has reasonable pros-
pects of success (PD 2.4.1); further, that it is not spurious or vexatious (PD 2.4.2a), 
in which case it is dismissed. Then follows a 15-day period for consultations between 
the objector and the CAB, organized by the Independent Adjudicator (PD 2.5). If 
agreement is not reached, ‘written representation’ commences, with defined proce-
dures for correspondence over a 30-day period (PD 2.6). If agreement is still not 
reached, the case goes to formal adjudication (PD 2.7), including an oral hearing. 
The decision of the Independent Adjudicator is final (PD 2.7–2.8).
The MSC certificate is valid for five years. The state of the fishery, as well as 
progress against the set milestones for any conditions attached to the certificate, is 
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monitored by the assessment team at annual surveillance audits (FCP 7.28). If a 
fishery client is behind target at a surveillance audit, remedial action is defined. If 
the fishery is not back on track for the next surveillance audit, it is suspended from 
MSC certification. A corrective action plan must be produced within 90 days of 
suspension, and if the terms of the plan are not complied with in the set timeframe, 
the certificate is withdrawn (FCP 7.28.16.2.b). If fishery clients intend to remain 
certified beyond the first five-year period, reassessment must be commenced no later 
than 90 days after the fourth anniversary of the certificate (FCP 7.30).
2.2 The substantive requirements: the MSC Fisheries Standard 
The MSC Fisheries Standard is organized in the so-called Assessment Tree, which 
spells out the specific requirements (guideposts) against which a fishery is assessed: 
89 SIs spread over 28 PIs within the three MSC Principles, with components as a 
mid-level category between principles and PIs. While the principles are thematically 
defined, the PIs can also be grouped into outcome, management and information 
indicators. Outcome indicators require that the fish stocks and other components of 
the ecosystem (like habitats) are at acceptable levels; for management indicators that 
adequate management measures are in place; and for information indicators that 
sufficient information exists to make appropriate management decisions. 
Principle 1 (P1) is defined as follows: 
Principle 1: Sustainable target fish stocks
A fishery must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to over-fishing or depletion 
of the exploited populations and, for those populations that are depleted, the fishery 
must be conducted in a manner that demonstrably leads to their recovery. (MSC 
Fisheries Standard, p. 5)
As follows from Figure 1, P1 consists of one outcome and one management com-
ponent; several PIs also include elements of information indicators. Component 1 
has only two PIs, one on the status of the stock (PI 1.1.1) and one on stock rebuild-
ing (PI 1.1.2). In order to pass PI 1.1.1, i.e. achieve a score of 60, it must be likely 
(defined as at least 70 % probability) that the target stock is above the point where 
recruitment would be impaired (PRI). To pass without condition, i.e. to score at or 
above 80, it must be highly likely (at least 80 % probability) that the stock is above 
PRI, and the stock must be fluctuating around a level consistent with the maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY). To achieve a 100 score, there must be a high degree of 
certainty (i.e. at least 95 % probability) that the stock is above PRI and that it has 
been fluctuating around or been above MSY over several years (depending on the 
life span of the stock). PI 1.1.2 on stock rebuilding is only scored if SG 80 is not met 
for PI 1.1.1 and sets specific requirements for a rebuilding strategy. Component 2 of 
P1 comprises PIs related to the existence of a harvest strategy (PI 1.2.1), a harvest 
control rule (PI 1.2.2), information to support the harvest strategy (PI 1.2.3) and 
scientific stock assessments (PI 1.2.4).1617 
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Principle 2 (P2) is defined as follows: 
Principle 2: Environmental impact of fishing
Fishing operations should allow for the maintenance of the structure, productivity, 
function and diversity of the ecosystem (including habitat and associated, dependent 
and ecologically related species) on which the fishery depends.1718
The P2 Assessment Tree (see Figure 2) has five thematically defined Components, 
on primary species; secondary species; endangered, threatened and protected (ETP) 
species; habitats and the wider ecosystem. Primary and secondary species both con-
cern bycatch, the former species managed by biological reference points, the latter 
species that are not. Each Component is split into PIs on outcome, management and 
information, respectively. P2 is clearly the most complex of the three MSC Fisheries 
Standard Principles. Not only does it contain a higher number of SIs than P1 and P3 
taken together (49, as opposed to 21 and 19, respectively), it also has a more compre-
hensive set of guidlines for interpretation and scoring. Since 2015, assessment teams 
Figure 1: Principle 1 default assessment tree16
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must not only assess the environmental impacts of the client fishery (the UoA), but 
also the accumulative impact of all MSC fisheries in the same region. 
Principle 3 (P3) is defined as follows: 
Principle 3: Effective management
The fishery is subject to an effective management system that respects local, national 
and international laws and standards and incorporates institutional and operational 
frameworks that require use of the resource to be responsible and sustainable.1820
Figure 2: Principle 2 default assessment tree19
Figure 3: Principle 3 default assessment tree21
Geir Hønneland
142
P3 is split into two components (see Figure 3): one on the wider management frame-
work of the fishery (at both the national and international levels) and one on the 
fishery-specific management system, i.e. the system directly involved in the manage-
ment of the UoA fishery. While P1 and P2 mainly focus on the status of ecosystem 
components and the appropriateness of specific management measures (whether 
they have, or are likely to have, the intended effects), P3 is about structure and process, 
e.g. whether appropriate legislation (PI 3.1.1), dispute-resolution mechanisms (PI 
3.1.1), opportunities for industry and other stakeholder involvement in the man-
agement process (PI 3.1.2) and appropriate objectives for the fishery (PIs 3.1.3 and 
3.2.1) are in place. 
3 MSC certification of Arctic fisheries: processes
We now move to an analysis of how the MSC Certification Requirements have 
been applied in practice in selected Arctic fisheries. What potentially dictates 
behavioural adaptation are the conditions attached to MSC certificates, the spe-
cific requirements for improvements that must be achieved during the five years 
the certificates are valid. While the contents of the conditions are presented in the 
next section, the present section focuses on the processes that led to them. Con-
ditions follow from the expert opinion of the assessment teams appointed by the 
CABs (one expert per Principle), but are influenced by input from peer reviewers, 
stakeholders and objectors to certification and, in the last instance, the MSC’s 
Independent Adjudicator.1922 
3.1 Cod and haddock in the Barents Sea
The first two Barents Sea fishery clients to apply for MSC certification, both 
in 2008, were the Norwegian Seafood Council and the Hong Kong-based Rus-
sian company Ocean Trawlers/Three Towns Capital (Ocean Trawlers henceforth). 
This difference in client structure reflects the different approaches to MSC cer-
tification taken by the two major fishing nations in the Barents Sea. In Norway, 
industry organizations like the Seafood Council and (later) the Norwegian Fish-
ermen’s Association pay for the assessments and let the entire Norwegian fleet 
be covered by the certificate. In Russia, individual companies seek their own 
certificate. 
The two initial assessments took 19 and 22 months to complete, respectively. 
Average (and median) duration of the initial assessments of Barents Sea cod and 
haddock fisheries was 17 months. The Norwegian fishery had three conditions 
attached to it, all for P2 (relating to bycatch, ETP species and habitats), while 
the Russian fishery had six, two for each principle. Of the latter, the P1 and P3 
principles were quickly closed at the first annual surveillance audits, while the P2 
conditions, on bycatch and habitats, remained open until the fourth surveillance 
audit.2023 All conditions for both fisheries were closed during the first certification 
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period, but the Norwegian fishery had two new P2 conditions at reassessment; 
the Russian fishery no longer had any conditions. The other Russian fisheries that 
followed had either no conditions or conditions on P2 only, particularly related to 
ETP species and habitats. 
While Norway and Russia account for the majority of Barents Sea fisheries – 
as mentioned above, the two coastal states keep approximately 85 % of the cod 
TAC for themselves – a number of other states are also involved. After the first 
Norwegian and Russian fisheries were certified in 2010, UK, German, French, 
Faroe and Icelandic fisheries followed suit in 2012, a Spanish fishery in 2013 
and a Greenlandic one in 2015. With this, practically all the Barents Sea cod 
and haddock fisheries are MSC certified. With the exception of the Greenlandic 
fishery, none of the third-country fisheries received any stakeholder submissions. 
With the exception of the combined UK/German (UK/DFFU/Doggerbank) fish-
ery, which also had some conditions on P3 related to the status of the Protection 
Zone around Svalbard,2124 all conditions were on P2, in particular 2.4 related to 
habitats. 
Table 1. Assessment and reassessment results of cod and haddock fisheries in the Barents Sea re-
certified as per 2019, compiled by the author based on assessment reports available on the MSC 
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*) The official names of the fisheries in the MSC system and the clients have been shortened here to save space.
**) Only submissions following publication of the PCDR are included in the table; many fisheries also  
received stakeholder submissions at earlier stages of the assessment. Technical oversight comments from 
MSC are not included although formally they fall under stakeholder comments. 
***) These submissions were not specific as to which PIs they were meant to address. 
Table 1. (Forstat)
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Of the 12 fisheries that have gone through initial assessment in the Barents Sea 
cod and haddock fisheries, seven received one or more stakeholder submissions. Six 
were from various regional offices of the WWF: WWF-Germany, WWF-Norway and 
WWF-Russia. The WWF’s comments to the first two assessments were extensive 
and spanned all three MSC Principles, while all subsequent submissions, including 
the ensuing reassessments, addressed habitat effects only. This was also the topic 
of the two objections lodged in the initial assessments (to the Greenlandic fish-
ery and one of the Russian companies, Murmanseld 2), both by WWF-Germany, 
the last one jointly with WWF-Russia. The objection to the Greenlandic fishery 
was lodged in October 2014 and formally dismissed by Independent Adjudicator 
Michael Lodge five months later, after extensive communication between the par-
ties. During this exchange of proposals and counter-proposals, the CAB (Intertek 
Fisheries Certification) had agreed to reduce some of its scores and introduce a new 
condition on PI 2.4.3 related to the availability of information on bottom habitats. 
WWF filed a similar objection to the reassessment of Ocean Trawlers, commenced 
in 2014 and completed two years later, which also received an objection to the scor-
ing of PIs 2.4.1-2.4.2. The Notice of Objection was submitted in April 2016 and 
formally withdrawn by the objector five months later. After extensive written con-
sultations between the CAB (Acoura Marine), the client and the objector, facilitated 
by Independent Adjudicator Eldon V.C. Greenberg, the parties reached agreement 
on the eve of the scheduled oral hearings in London. No changes were made in the 
scoring of the fishery, but several clarifications were added to the text of the assess-
ment report. 
Three years later, WWF-Germany and WWF-Russia jointly objected on simi-
lar grounds to the certification of the Russian company Murmanseld 2, which was 
undergoing initial assessment by the certification body DNV GL. Essentially, WWF 
argued that the assessment team had failed to identify vulnerable marine ecosystems 
within the area of the fishery and scored the habitat performance indicator without 
considering quantitative research data. This objection went through the entire objec-
tion procedure laid down in the FCP: initial consultations and exchange of written 
representations followed by formal adjudication including oral hearings and subse-
quent correspondence before the Independent Adjudicator made his final decision. 
In the event, Independent Adjudicator John McKendrick QC, basing his decision 
on the parties’ submissions, the MSC Certification Requirements and Interpreta-
tion Log,2225 as well as “principles of English […] administrative law”,2326 to a large 
extent accepted the premises for WWF’s objection. In his 25-page long Post Hearing 
Decision, he concluded by remanding the case to the CAB for rescoring and the 
introduction of two new conditions to the certificate. WWF objected to this conclu-
sion as they had wanted a larger reduction in scores, but in his Final Decision the 
Independent Adjudicator dismissed this objection and accepted the CAB’s revised 
Final (Assessment) Report. Hence, as a result of the objection new conditions were 
attached to the certificate, although they were not as strict as demanded by WWF. 
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3.2 In-shore lumpfish in Greenland, Iceland and Norway
Unlike the Barents Sea fisheries, which are operated by large trawlers plying the 
oceans for months on end, the Arctic lumpfish fishery is a typical small-scale, local 
fishery. It is conducted by small vessels, often one-man boats, using gillnets in fjords 
and close to shore. Lumpfish is caught for its roe, which is largely exported. 
The first lumpfish fishery to enter MSC assessment was the Icelandic fishery, in 
2013. The assessment took 22 months to complete. The Greenlandic fishery followed 
a year later and the Norwegian in 2016; these took 16 and 15 months, respectively.2427 
All fisheries received stakeholder comments (two each for the Greenlandic and Nor-
wegian and five for the Icelandic), and two of them had an objection lodged against 
them (the Greenlandic and Icelandic fisheries). Stakeholders providing comments 
ranged from fishing associations, local and international NGOs and a research insti-
tute. The objectors were the US Animal Welfare Institute (for the Icelandic fishery) 
and BirdLife International (for the Greenlandic fishery).
In its objection to the certification of the Icelandic fishery, the US Animal Welfare 
Institute claimed that there was “significant information lacking in the assessment 
on known bycatch of cetacean species in this fishery. Entanglements of minke and 
humpback whales, common dolphins and harbor porpoise in the Icelandic lumpfish 
gillnet fishery have been noted in both scientific and popular literature.”2528 However, 
Independent Adjudicator Michael Lodge dismissed the objection on procedural 
grounds. 
BirdLife International’s objection during the assessment of the Greenlandic fish-
eries was also processed quickly, in less than two months. The objection related in 
its entirety to bycatch of birds, but it addressed all three elements of the bycatch 
component of the Assessment Tree: outcome (status of the stocks), management and 
information. The objector claimed, inter alia, that it is “near-impossible to quantify 
bycatch [of, e.g., common eider and common guillemot] adequately and, further, 
to determine whether this is hindering the full recovery of seabird populations that 
are increasing in number after over-harvesting.”2629 Further, the absence of mitiga-
tion measures and a strategy to avoid bycatch of birds was highlighted. Facilitated 
by Independent Adjudicator Melanie Carter, agreement was reached between the 
objector and the CAB, in close communication with the fishery client, after one 
round of written consultations. As a result, three new conditions were introduced 
related to bycatch of birds in the fishery: one for the outcome, one for the manage-
ment and one for the information PI. 
The Greenland fishery met all its conditions during the five-year certification 
period and entered reassessment in 2019. It was reassessed in 2020 with four new 
conditions, again all related to the fishery’s effects on seabirds.2730 But this time no 
stakeholder comments were received, or objections lodged. The Icelandic fishery, 
on the other hand, never made it to reassessment. At the third annual surveillance 
audit, in 2017, new information on seabirds was made available to the assessment 
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Table 2. Assessment and reassessment results of inshore lumpfish fisheries in Greenland, Iceland 
and Norway certified as per 2019, compiled by the author based on assessment reports available 




Conditions Stakeholder submissions** Objections
Iceland lumpfish 19.2.2013/
23.12.2014
–  PIs 2.2.2, 
2.2.3
–  Fuglaverndarfelag Islands 
(Fuglavernd) (PI 2.2.3)
–  Environmental Investigation 
Agency (US) (PIs 2.2.1-2.2.3)
–  Animal Welfare Institute (US) 
(PIs 1.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 3.1.4)
–  Royal Greenland and 
KNAPK (Greenland Fishing 
and Hunting Association) 
(procedural)
–  Dr. Reiner Froese, GEOMAR 
Helmholz-Centre for Ocean 
Research (general P1 
comments)













–  BirdLife International (PIs 
2.2.1-2.2.3)
–  National Association of Small 
Boat Owners (general P1/P2 
comments)






–  PIs 1.2.2, 
1.2.4, 2.3.1, 
2.3.2
–  BirdLife International (PIs 
2.3.1-2.3.3)
–  WWF-Germany (general 
comments across all three 
principles)
None













18.3.2020/N/A**** –  PIs 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 
2.2.3, 2.3.2****
N/A**** N/A****
*) The official names of the fisheries in the MSC system and the clients have been shortened here to save 
space.
**) Technical oversight comments from MSC are not included although formally they fall under stakeholder 
comments. 
***) The fishery is still under (re-)assessment. The PCDR was published 2 April 2020. This implies that the 
report had been through peer review, but the deadline for stakeholder comments had not passed at the time 
of writing (April 2020).
****) As the certificate for the Iceland lumpfish fishery was withdrawn 18 April 2019 (after having been 
suspended 4 January 2018), this is not a reassessment, but a new attempt at initial assessment. As the new 
assessment has just been announced at the time of writing (April 2020), scores and indication of conditions 
are based on the ACDR, hence only provisional. 
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team. This was partly the result of data collection initiated by the fishery client (by 
engaging scientists and independent observers in the fishery) to meet the conditions 
attached to its MSC certificate. This new information provided evidence to the effect 
that the 60 score threshold for PIs 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 was no longer met, which implied 
that the fishery now failed. The certificate was suspended in January 2018 and 
withdrawn in April 2019. In March 2020, a new attempt at initial certification was 
made.2831 The ACDR, the first draft version of the assessment report published at the 
time of the fishery’s announcement, only gives provisional scores, but at that stage 
data supported the assumption that all PIs will achieve a minimum of a 60 score, 
and the fishery will pass, albeit with new conditions related to the fishery’s effects on 
the harbour seal stock.2932
In summary, the Arctic inshore lumpfish fisheries, just like the Barents Sea fisher-
ies, had a considerable number of conditions attached to their first (and some to their 
second) MSC certificate, some brought on by successful objections. This section has 
demonstrated how stakeholders such as NGOs and scientists have challenged assess-
ment teams and provided new perspectives on the fisheries under assessment. But 
it has shown that ‘complaints’, whether in the form of stakeholder submissions or 
objections, do not automatically impact the outcome of assessments. The process is 
evidence based and the assessments carried out by assessors with relevant scientific 
background, most of them at PhD level. While their scoring of a fishery is not above 
criticism, it is seldom unfounded. There are also a number of procedural checks and 
balances in the CPR, including the authoritative decision making of the Indepen-
dent Adjudicator. In brief, stakeholder submissions and objections provide an extra 
layer of quality check of assessment reports, beyond that of thorough external peer 
review and technical oversight by the MSC itself, and help sharpen the attention 
of the CABs and their assessment teams. But as a result of the thoroughness of the 
assessment work and comprehensiveness of MSC’s procedural requirements, the bar 
is high for stakeholders to change the conclusions of the CABs. Of the five objections 
lodged against the assessments above, one was dismissed on procedural grounds. 
In the remaining four, some sort of compromise was found, although formally they 
were either partly dismissed, partly accepted or withdrawn. 
4 MSC certification of Arctic fisheries: outcomes
“A completed condition means a fishery’s score meets best practice,” reads the 
MSC website,3033 accompanied by the information that 92 % of certified fisher-
ies have had at least one condition attached to them, which must be met during 
the five-year validity of the certificate. From 2016 to 2018, 288 conditions were 
invoked, half of them on P2, the rest evenly distributed between P1 and P3. The 
most common type of action required was research, followed by assessment of 
the fishery’s impact and “technical action” (such as gear modifications).3134 While 
the previous section outlined how external actors have sought to affect the outcome 
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of assessments, we now turn to the conditions set by the assessment teams and how 
fishery clients have gone about meeting the requirements of the conditions. How 
have they adapted their own behaviour, and to what extent have they succeeded in 
influencing management practice, including legislation, at the national and inter-
national levels? What has been achieved in terms of more sustainable fisheries man-
agement and fishing practices?3235
In the Barents Sea fisheries, there were a few P1 and P3 conditions in the early 
assessments (see Table 1), but most conditions (and all conditions since 2013) have 
been on P2, in particular related to ETP species and habitats. All stakeholder sub-
missions since 2013, and all three objections, have addressed the impact of bottom 
trawling on habitats. As we have seen, half of the clients in the Barents Sea are 
Russian fishing companies. Remarkably, given their unwillingness to share certifi-
cates, all the Russian clients have addressed their habitat-related conditions jointly; 
the scientific research institute PINRO and WWF-Murmansk (the local branch of 
WWF-Russia) are also on board.3336 The cooperation between the companies involves 
four elements: first, a new semi-pelagic, ‘near-bottom’ trawl has been designed and 
tested, which, if put to use in the commercial fisheries, will reduce the impact on 
bottom habitats considerably. The project is financed by the clients jointly, according 
to an agreed cost distribution key. Second, a programme for registration of benthic 
encounters has been designed by WWF and put to use on client vessels.3437 Third, the 
Russian clients have jointly created the Coordination Council for the Development 
of Sustainable Fisheries in the North and signed the Agreement on the Coordi-
nation of Actions of Fishing Companies to Minimize the Impact of Bottom Trawl 
Fishery on the Benthic Ecosystems in the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea, both in 
2016.3538 Fourth, under the Coordination Council agreement, the client companies 
have committed to not entering new fishing grounds in the Barents Sea (e.g. areas 
in the northern parts of the Barents Sea which are becoming more accessible due 
to changes in ice coverage) until these areas have been appropriately researched.3639 
Based on information in the annual surveillance audit reports, there is little doubt 
that these developments follow directly from the clients’ endeavours to meet their 
MSC conditions. However, there is no evidence that management practice, national 
legislation or international agreement between Norway and Russia in their Joint 
Commission, have been affected by the MSC assessments. 100 % of the Norwegian 
fleet and more than 85 % of the Russian fleet are MSC certified,3740 and the relevant 
authorities on both sides are consulted at each annual surveillance audit, so they are 
well aware of their national fleets being in the MSC programme. But there is com-
plete silence about the private certification schemes from the responsible authori-
ties. If you search for “MSC” or “Marine Stewardship Council” on the websites of 
Norwegian and Russian fisheries management bodies,3841 or in the protocols of the 
Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission,3942 not a single hit comes up. Private 
certification is apparently not something they want to flag as part of the overarching 
management of the fisheries.4043
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The conditions for third-country fisheries also relate in the main to P2, in 
particular to the protection of ETP species and habitat structures. The require-
ments to the fishery clients, which were all met during the five-year certification 
period, included recording of by-catch beyond what is required by Norwegian 
and Russian regulations; voluntary restraint to fishing grounds with historic foot-
print (documented to the assessment team at annual surveillance audits by vessel 
monitoring system (VMS) logs); production of company-level strategies, codes 
of conduct and action plans to avoid encounters with sponges and coral gardens; 
and obligatory training of crews on identification of ETP species and habitat 
structures.4144
In the small-scale lumpfish fisheries, the direct effects of MSC certification are 
more immediately apparent. Problems identified at initial certification were lack of 
appropriate reference points, harvest control rules and management plans, as well 
as strategies to mitigate bycatch of seabirds and marine mammals. New reference 
points and harvest control rules have been produced in Greenland and are under-
way in Norway.4245 Monitoring of the bycatch of seabirds (and in Iceland marine 
mammals) has increased in all three countries, and new mitigation strategies pro-
duced.4346 Anecdotal evidence suggests that MSC certification is a “to be or not to 
be” requirement to get lumpfish roe sold on the global market, so fishing companies 
are prepared to go to great lengths to get the authorities to adopt the precautionary 
measures necessary for them to achieve and retain MSC certification.4447 In April 
2020, the Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture was explicit about the role 
of certification in its press release about a precautionary seasonal halt of the lump-
fish fishery, which was due to the need to keep fishing “in accordance with scientific 
advice” and “to ensure that the existing certifications are not lost.”4548 Hence, there 
is a direct link between MSC requirements and national regulations, as explicitly 
stated by the relevant authorities themselves. 
5 Conclusions
All the major Barents Sea cod and haddock fisheries have been MSC certified 
since 2010 and the small-scale lumpfish fisheries since 2014. The incidence of con-
ditions, stakeholder submissions and objections provides an indication of the state 
of the fisheries in question – the more of these, the more controversial the fishery. 
The most conspicuous trait in the Barents Sea fisheries is that all stakeholder sub-
missions and objections (and practically all conditions) relate to P2, in particular 
to components 2.3 and 2.4 of the Assessment Tree, i.e. the protection of ETP 
species and habitats. First of all, this tells us that the status and management of the 
target stocks (P1), as well as the general functioning of the management regime 
(P3), are considered unproblematic and not in need of any additional action for 
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the fishery clients in order to achieve and retain certification. This reflects the gen-
eral view of the Barents Sea fisheries as well regulated within the established man-
agement structure at the national and international levels. The MSC programme 
is there to document that, but it does not add anything itself in terms of improved 
management. 
Second, all but two fisheries had conditions related to ETP species or habitats in 
their initial assessment; half of them had stakeholder submissions on these issues, 
and two objections were lodged. At recertification, nearly half the fisheries still had 
conditions; nearly half received stakeholder submissions, and one certification was 
objected to. As a result of the three objections, additional conditions were introduced 
in two of the fisheries. This implies that nearly all fishery clients have been required 
to improve their efforts to avoid damage to ETP species and bottom habitats, e.g. 
through additional recording of catches, voluntary adherence to fishing grounds 
with historic footprints, production of company-level strategies to avoid encounters 
with sponges and corals; and obligatory training of crews on species identification. 
Most conspicuous are the joint efforts of the Russian fishery clients in this regard, 
not least the development of new fishing gear in cooperation with science and WWF. 
Equally notable is the absence of new regulations as a result of the MSC conditions. 
The effect of MSC certification in the Barents Sea is changed fishing practice, not 
changed management. 
All the lumpfish fisheries received conditions at both initial assessment and reas-
sessment; all received several stakeholder submissions; and two of three fisheries 
received an objection. One of the certificates was also withdrawn midway in the cer-
tification period. In other words, these are controversial fisheries which are balancing 
on the edge as far as MSC certification is concerned. On the other side of the coin, 
this provides an opportunity for the MSC to play a role. Essential parts of a man-
agement regime, such as biological reference points and harvest control rules, have 
in the Arctic lumpfish fisheries come about as a direct result of MSC certification. 
There is also evidence that authorities have justified practical management decisions 
with the need to keep the national fleet MSC certified. 
MSC certification is no panacea, but it seems to have found a niche as a supple-
ment to national legislation and international agreements. In the lumpfish fisheries, 
it became a catalyst for the speedy production of reference points and harvest con-
trol rules. In the Barents Sea, MSC served to fill an important gap in an otherwise 
well-developed management regime: the protection of bottom habitats. The MSC 
fishery clients (like the fisheries associations in Iceland and Norway and the indi-
vidual fishing companies in Russia) are becoming important communication hubs, 
working with the authorities and science to meet the conditions imposed on them by 





AGARBA (Spain) [AGARBA Spain Barents Sea cod] (1-FA 2013, Food Certification International; 1-SA 
2015, 2-SA 2016, 3-SA 2017, 4-SA 2018, 1-RA 2019, Bureau Veritas (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/
fisheries/agarba-spain-barents-sea-cod/@@view) 
Arkhangelsk Trawl Fleet (Russia) [Arkhangelsk Trawl Fleet Barents and Norwegian Seas cod, haddock, saithe 
and Greenland halibut] (1-FA 2016, 1-SA 2017, 2-SA 2018, Acoura Marine; 3-SA 2019, Lloyd’s 
Register) (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/arkhangelsk-trawl-fleet-norwegian-barents-seas-cod-
haddock-saithe-greenland-halibut/@@view)
Faroe Islands/Iceland [Faroe Islands and Iceland North East Arctic cod and haddock] (1-FA 2012, 1-SA 2013, 
2-SA 2014, 3-SA 2015, 4-SA 2016, 1-RA 2017, DNV GL) (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/faroe-
islands-and-iceland-north-east-arctic-cod-haddock-and-saithe/@@view) 
FIUN (Russia) [FIUN Barents & Norwegian Seas cod and haddock] (1-FA 2013, 1-SA 2014, 2-SA 2015, 
Food Certification International; 3-SA 2016, 4-SA 2017, 1-RA 2018, Acoura Marine) (https://fisheries.
msc.org/en/fisheries/fiun-barents-norwegian-seas-cod-and-haddock/@@view) 
Greenland [Greenland cod, haddock and saithe] (1-FA 2015, Intertek Fisheries Certification, 1-SA 2016, 
2-SA 2017, 1-RA 2019, Acoura Marine) (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/greenland-cod-haddock-
and-saithe-trawl-fishery/@@view)
Greenland lumpfish [Greenland lumpfish] (1-FA 2015, 1-SA 2016, 2-SA 2017, 3-SA 2018, 4-SA 2019, 1-RA 
2020, DNV GL) (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/greenland-lumpfish/@@assessments) 
Iceland lumpfish [Iceland Gillnet lumpfish] (1-FA 2014, 1-SA 2015, 2-SA 2016, 3-SA 2017, Vottunarstofan 
Tún) (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/icelandic-gillnet-lumpfish/@@assessments) Fishery 
withdrawn in 2017; entered new assessment in 2020 under the name “ISF Iceland lumpfish” (2-FA 
2020, SAI Global) (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/isf-iceland-lumpfish/@@assessments) 
Murmanseld 2 (Russia) [Murmanseld 2 Barents Sea cod and haddock] (1-FA 2020, DNV GL) (https://
fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/murmanseld-2-barents-sea-cod-and-haddock/@@view)
Norway lumpfish [NFA Norway ling & tusk and NFA Norway lumpfish] (1-FA 2017, Acoura Marine; 1-SA 
2019, 2-SA 2020, DNV GL) (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/nfa-norway-ling-tusk-and-nfa-
norway-lumpfish/@@assessments)
Norway (Norw. Seafood Council) [Norway North East Arctic cod] (1-FA 2010, 1-SA 2011, 2-SA 2012, 3-SA 
2013, 4-SA 2014, 1-RA 2015, DNV GL) (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/norway-north-east-
arctic-cod/@@assessments) 
Ocean Trawlers (Russia) [Barents Sea cod, haddock and saithe] (1-FA 2010, 1-SA 2011, 2-SA 2012, 3-SA 
2013, 4-SA 2015, Food Certification International; 1-RA 2016, Acoura Marine) (https://fisheries.msc.
org/en/fisheries/barents-sea-cod-haddock-and-saithe/@@view) 
Oceanprom (Russia) [Oceanprom Barents Sea cod and haddock] (1-FA 2019, DNV GL) (https://fisheries.
msc.org/en/fisheries/oceanprom-barents-sea-cod-and-haddock/@@assessments) 
Saint Malo/Euronor (France) [Compagnie des Pêches Saint Malo and Euronor cod and haddock] (1-FA 2012, 
1-SA 2013, 2-SA 2014, MacAlister Elliott and Partners Ltd.; 3-SA 2015, 4-SA 2016, 1-RA 2017, 
ME Certification Ltd.) (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/compagnie-des-peches-saint-malo-and-
euronor-cod-and-haddock/@@view) 
Strelets/Eridan (Russia) [Russian Federation Barents Sea cod, haddock and saithe] (1-FA 2014, 1-SA 2015, 
2-SA 2016, 3-SA 2017, 4-SA 2018, 1-RA 2019, DNV GL) (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/
russian-federation-barents-sea-cod-haddock-and-saithe/@@view) 
UK Fisheries/DFFU/Doggerbank [UK Fisheries Ltd./DFFU/Doggerbank Northeast Arctic cod, haddock and 
saithe] (1-FA 2012, 1-SA 2013, 2-SA 2014, MacAlister Elliott and Partners Ltd., 3-SA 2015, 4-SA 
2016, 1-RA 2017, ME Certification Ltd.) (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/uk-fisheries-ltd-dffu-
doggerbank-northeast-arctic-cod-haddock-and-saithe/@@view) 
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NOTES
 1. See https://www.ourgssi.org/. Local standards Responsible Fisheries Management (RFM) 
standards for Alaska and Iceland achieved accreditation before the MSC. 
 2. See https://www.msc.org/. 
 3. See, e.g., Kar H. Lim, Wuyang Hu, Rodolfo M. Nayga Jr., “Is Marine Stewardship Coun-
cil’s Ecolabel a Rising Tide for All? Consumers’ Willingness to Pay for Origin-Differentiated 
Ecolabel Canned Tuna,” Marine Policy 96 (2018): 18–26. 
 4. See, e.g., Lars H. Gulbrandsen and Graeme Auld, “Contested Accountability Logics in 
Evolving Nonstate Certification for Fisheries Sustainability,” Global Environmental Politics 
16 (2016): 42–60. 
 5. See, e.g., Ashleigh Arton, Anthony Leiman, Gillian Petrokofsky, Hilde Toonen and Catherine 
S. Longo, “What do We Know about the Impacts of the Marine Stewardship Council Sea-
food Ecolabelling Program? A Systematic Map,” Environmental Evidence 9 (2020): 1–20. 
This is just a small selection of topics covered in the literature about MSC. A search in the 
Web of Science database for academic journals (www.webofknowledge.com) (accessed 21 
April 2020). generates 161 articles, of which 131 have been published since 2012. The larg-
est disciplinary categories are Environmental Studies (53), Fisheries (41) and International 
Relations (39). A large number of the articles are empirical studies of MSC assessments in 
specific geographic regions. I have not come across other studies of MSC assessments in the 
Arctic, but some of the Russian Barents Sea fisheries are analysed in articles about MSC 
assessments in Russia (Lars H. Gulbrandsen and Geir Hønneland, “Fisheries Certification 
in Russia: The Emergence of Non-State Authority in a Postcommunist Economy,” Ocean 
Development and International Law 45 (2014): 341–359; Dmitry Lajus, Daria Stogova and 
E. Carina H. Keskitalo, “The Implementation of Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) Cer-
tification in Russia: Achievements and Considerations,” Marine Policy 90 (2018): 105–114; 
Alexey O. Pristupa, Machiel Lamers and Bas Amelung, “Private Informational Governance 
in Post-Soviet Waters: Implications of the Marine Stewardship Council Certification in the 
Russian Barents Sea Region,” Fisheries Research 182 (2016): 128–135). 
 6. I have to make a certain analytical reservation with regard to causation. It may be possible to 
point empirically to a chronological link between MSC certification, revised regulations and 
fisher behaviour, and sometimes the sources (i.e. MSC assessment reports) claim that there 
is also a causal link. However, it goes beyond the ambition of this article to test alternative 
explanations to the observed behaviour.
 7. In the Barents Sea, MSC coverage is close to 100 per cent for the commercial demersal 
species taken by Norway, Russia and third states. All three commercial lumpfish fisheries 
in the Arctic (the Greenlandic, Icelandic and Norwegian) are MSC certified (the Icelandic 
fishery admittedly withdrew in 2019, but is applying for a new certificate in 2020). The three 
countries have a high coverage of MSC certification in general. In both Iceland and Norway, 
certification is taken care of by associations (Iceland Sustainable Fisheries and the Norwe-
gian Fishermen’s Association, respectively) and the certificates made available to the entire 
national fleets. 
 8. “Avtale mellom Regjeringen i Unionen av Sovjetiske Sosialistiske Republikker og Regjerin-
gen i Kongeriket Norge om samarbeid innen fiskerinæringen,“ (“Agreement between the 
Government of the Union of the the Soviet Socialist Republics and the Kingdom of Norway 
on Cooperation in the Fishing Industry”), in Overenskomster med fremmede stater (“Agree-
ments with Foreign States”), Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975, pp. 546–549. 
 9. Three additional stocks have later been added to the list of joint stocks: capelin (60 % to 
Norway, 40 % to Russia), Greenland halibut (51 % to Norway, 45 % to Russia and 4 % to 
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third countries) and beaked redfish (72 % to Norway, 18 % to Russia and 10 % to third 
countries). 
 10. See, e.g., Protokoll for den 49. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon 
(“Protocol from the 49th Session of the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commis-
sion”), Appendix 3, Petrozavodsk, 17 October 2019; available at https://www.jointfish.com/
OM-FISKERIKOMMISJONEN/PROTOKOLLER.html (accessed 29 June 2020). 
 11. For an overview, see Geir Hønneland, Making Fishery Agreements Work: Post-Agreement Bar-
gaining in the Barents Sea (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013). 
 12. I am myself a certified MSC auditor and have been involved in fishery assessments as an 
expert on MSC Principle 3 (the management system). This includes the Russian Barents 
Sea fisheries and the Norwegian and Icelandic (second attempt) Arctic lumpfish fisheries 
discussed in this article. My practical experience and training in applying the MSC Standard 
have helped me navigate the voluminous body of documentation available on MSC assess-
ments. The empirical investigation is based solely on publicly available documents – hence, 
I see no conflict of interest or other ethical problems. 
 13. MSC Fisheries Standard Version 2.01, 31 August 2018 (effective 28 February 2019), Lon-
don: Marine Stewardship Council; available at https://www.msc.org/docs/default-source/
default-document-library/for-business/program-documents/fisheries-program-documents/
msc-fisheries-standard-v2-01.pdf?sfvrsn=8ecb3272_13 (accessed 29 June 2020). 
 14. MSC Fisheries Certification Process Version 2.1, 31 August 2018 (effective 28 February 




 15. The Guidance states that “outstanding disputes of substantial magnitude involving a signif-
icant number of interests will normally disqualify a fishery from certification. However, the 
existence of controversies or disputes are of themselves not enough to stop a fishery from 
being eligible for certification. […] The judgement should be whether a dispute compro-
mises the ability of the management system to provide sustainable management.” (G7.4.5)
 16. MSC Fisheries Standard, p. 11.
 17. A harvest control rule is defined as “a set of well-defined pre-agreed rules or actions used for 
determining a management action in response to changes in indicators of stock status with 
respect to reference points” (MSC-MSCI vocabulary, available at https://www.msc.org/docs/
default-source/default-document-library/for-business/program-documents/chain-of-custo-
dy-supporting-documents/msc-msci_vocabulary_v1-2.pdf?sfvrsn=cef284dd_14) (accessed 
22 August 2020). 
 18. MSC Fisheries Standard, p. 5. 
 19. MSC Fisheries Standard, p. 27
 20. MSC Fisheries Standard, p. 5. 
 21. MSC Fisheries Standard, p. 62.
 22. All information in the text below refers to the two tables in this section, one for each cluster 
of fisheries. That information, in turn, is taken from the assessment reports for each fishery 
listed in Appendix 1. It follows from the context which report each piece of information is 
taken from; for example, all information about the Ocean Trawlers assessment is taken from 
the assessment report for that fishery listed in Appendix 1. All information on fulfilment of 
previous conditions is taken from the 4th surveillance audit report in the preceding certifica-
tion cycle. Page reference is only provided for direct citations, using the coding provided for 
in the footnote of the Appendix (e.g., 1-FA = 1st full assessment report; 4-SA = 4th surveil-
lance audit report). 
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 23. The P1 conditions had to do with the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission 
departing from the restraint in the harvest control rule not to raise the cod TAC by more 
than 15 % from one year to another, which it had done in a year with exceptionally high stock 
biomass. The P3 conditions required lobbying from the client in order to propagate precau-
tion in Russian fisheries legislation and the inclusion of NGOs in consultation mechanisms. 
 24. International disagreement on the status of the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard 
has not been an issue in any of the other Barents Sea assessments as the assessment teams 
have observed that the legal disagreement among states has not had adverse impacts on the 
effectiveness of the management of the Barents Sea fisheries. In the UK/DFFU/Doggerbank 
fishery, the assessment team, noting that it was not competent to make any legal judgement 
of the issue, leaned on the fishery client’s opinion and concluded that the quota distribution 
in the Svalbard zone was “unfair” (1-FA, p. 48). The condition required the client to engage 
with EU bodies of governance and urge them to bring “the Svalbard dispute” up with Nor-
wegian authorities. According to the ensuring annual surveillance reports, the client did that, 
without the “dispute” being solved or EU authorities even making an effort to bring this 
up with Norway. The condition was not repeated when the fishery was recertified five years 
later. In later versions of the MSC Standard, the requirements for harmonization among 
fisheries have become much stricter and it would no longer be possible for only one fishery 
to have a condition for an alleged shortcoming that is common to all fisheries in the area. 
 25. The MSC Interpretations Log (https://mscportal.force.com/interpret/s/) is a tool for CABs, 
assessment teams and the ASI to ensure consistent interpretation of the Standard and its 
Guidance. It contains authoritative interpretations of specific requirements based on dilem-
mas that have emerged in the practical application of the Standard. Interpretations are 
sometimes included in the Guidance in its subsequent five-year revision. 
 26. Murmanseld 2 assessment, 1-FA, p. 289.
 27. Individual fishing companies were the clients for the Icelandic and Greenlandic fisheries, 
whereas the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association was the client for the Norwegian fishery. 
 28. Iceland lumpfish assessment, 1-FA, p. 259.
 29. Greenland lumpfish assessment, 1-FA, p. 261. 
 30. One might wonder how new conditions can be introduced at reassessment as one might 
expect any problems in the fishery to be detected at initial assessment and mitigated by 
the work to close conditions. While the situation in the fishery might have changed, new 
conditions are most often the result of revisions of the MSC Standards. With every five-year 
revision, the requirements of the Standard get stricter. This has in particular been the case 
for P2 as ecosystem considerations have been given ever more attention. 
 31. This time the client was Iceland Sustainable Fisheries (ISF), an industry alliance set up to 
facilitate MSC certification of all Icelandic fisheries. 
 32. Iceland lumpfish 2-FA
 33. https://www.msc.org/what-we-are-doing/our-collective-impact/fisheries-improving 
(accessed 29 June 2020). 
 34. Ibid. 
 35. Just like in the last section, all information is taken from the MSC assessment reports for the 
respective fisheries; see Appendix 1 for list of reports and their coding for reference. 
 36. See, e.g., the FIUN assessment, 1-RA, p. 179. 
 37. Ibid., p. 189. 
 38. See, e.g., the FIUN assessment, 1-SA (under first reassessment), p. 16. 
 39. By contrast, the achievements of the Norwegian client are less clear – as opaquely described 
in the 4th surveillance audit report to sum up activities over the last five-year period: “The 
client engaged with IMR and DoF from the time of the original certification to formal-
ise earlier voluntary arrangements for minimising adverse interactions between fishing and 
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sensitive marine habitats. Vessels continue to contribute data to the MAREANO programme 
on an opportunistic basis.” (Norway (Norw. Seafood Council) assessment, 4-SA, p. 27). 
 40. All Norwegian vessels are covered by the Norway North East Arctic cod certificate. The 
number of Russian vessels certified is approximate, based on the numbers of vessels indi-
cated in the various assessment reports. 
 41. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dep/nfd/id709/ (Ministry of Industry and Fisheries, Nor-
way), https://www.fiskeridir.no/ (Directorate of Fisheries, Norway), http://www.fish.gov.ru/ 
(Federal Fisheries Agency, Russian Federation) (accessed 20 May 2020). 
 42. https://www.jointfish.com/ (website of the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission) 
(accessed 20 May 2020). 
 43. A reason for this might be that authorities view the MSC as a “competitor” and/or inappro-
priate “intruder” in national fisheries management. Admittedly, Norwegian authorities have 
contributed to MSC certification of Norwegian fisheries through the Norwegian Fisher-
men’s Association and Seafood Council, but that does not mean that they have done so with 
enthusiasm. More importantly, civil servants set to manage Norwegian fisheries might not 
embrace requirements from MSC assessment teams (through the MSC clients) to adjust 
Norwegian regulations in accordance with the MSC Standard, which is generally perceived 
as a straightjacket designed to fit all types of fisheries, small- or large-scale, around the world. 
It should be noted that this is based on the author’s personal observation and has not been 
part of the investigation on which this article is built. 
 44. See, e.g., Greenland cod and haddock assessment, 3-SA, pp. 18–19. 
 45. Greenland lumpfish assessment, 4-SA, pp. 26–27; Norway lumpfish assessment, 2-SA, 
pp. 37–43. 
 46. Greenland lumpfish assessment, 4-SA, pp. 28–30; Iceland lumpfish assessment, 3-SA, 
pp. 17–20; Norway lumpfish assessment, 2-SA, pp. 39 – 43, p. 51. 
 47. Anecdotal evidence, based on the author’s own experience. 
 48. https://www.stjornarradid.is/efst-a-baugi/frettir/stok-frett/2020/04/30/Breyting-a-reglugerd-
um-veidar-a-grasleppu-2020/, accessed 30 April 2020. The English formulation follows 
from Google translate. The statement was imprecise in that the certificate was already lost, 
but assessment was underway to get it reinstated. 
 49. In this list of MSC assessment reports, the short name given in Tables 1 and 2 are provided 
first. The official MSC names follow in square brackets, for reference in the MSC website’s 
“Track a Fishery” function (https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/). FA = full assessment; 
SA = surveillance audit; RA = reassessment. Hence, 2-SA means the second annual sur-
veillance audit in the five-year certification cycle. The names of the certification bodies, as 
formal publishers of the reports, are also given. “1-FA 2010, 1-SA 2011, 2-SA 2012, 3-SA 
2013, 4 -SA 2014, Moody Marine; 1-RA 2015, Food Certification International” means 
that all reports up until 2014 were published by Moody Marine, while the 2015 report was 
published by Food Certification International. 
